CONDITIONS AND PROCEDURAL ORDER FOR APPLYING THE GROUNDS FOR TERMINATION OF CHARGES

Abstract

This thesis examines the legal nature, procedural foundations, and practical challenges associated with the termination of charges within criminal proceedings. The study argues that the institution of terminating charges is fundamentally distinct from the modification or supplementation of the indictment, both in its substantive legal character and procedural implications. Through an analysis of Articles 83, 84, and 362 of the Criminal Procedure Code (CPC), the research demonstrates that termination—whether full or partial—is permissible only where circumstances exist that either exonerate the accused or legally preclude further proceedings. The thesis further reveals inconsistencies in legislative drafting, noting that the CPC does not explicitly specify the applicability of Articles 83 and 84 for partial termination, resulting in divergent judicial interpretations. A systematic review of CPC provisions shows that the grounds for termination possess universal procedural significance across all stages of criminal proceedings, including appellate and supervisory review. The thesis concludes by proposing a refined doctrinal definition of the grounds for termination, emphasizing their dual substantive–procedural nature and their relevance to the factual structure of the case, the legal status of the accused, and the evidentiary sufficiency of individual episodes. The findings contribute to the development of clearer legislative regulation and more consistent judicial practice in applying the institution of terminating charges.